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I use a unique dataset of 1,808 mutual fund manager replacements to study the
determinants and the subsequent impact of the choice between hiring the successor from
within (internal hire) and outside (external hire) the fund family. I find that fund families
prefer to replace their top performers with internal hires and bottom performers with
external hires. External hires demonstrate superior ability to turn around bottom
performing funds, but exhibit inferior ability to maintain the record of top performing
funds. I find no cross-sectional difference in post-replacement performance between
internal and external successors, indicating fund families, in general, make their
replacement decisions optimally. I do, however, find that funds that deviate from the
optimal decision have subsequent sub-par performance. Overall, the evidence suggests
that portfolio managers play a pivotal role in determining mutual fund performance.
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I. Introduction
Mutual fund managerial replacement is a critical event that often draws much
attention. It consists of two parts: the displacement of the predecessor, and the placement
of the successor. Prior literature has largely focused on the former. 1 Relatively little is
known about how fund families make their succession decisions. In this paper, I assemble
a unique dataset of 1,808 managerial replacement events between 1996 and 2010 to study
the choice between hiring the successor from within (internal hire) and outside (external
hire) the fund family. In particular, this study provides evidence on three related
questions. (1) What are the factors that drive the decision of successor origin (i.e. internal
versus external hire)? (2) Do factors such as the manager’s industry experience and
educational background matter for the hiring decisions? (3) Do successor attributes relate
to post-turnover fund performance? The answers to these questions shed light on the
importance of portfolio managers to mutual fund performance.
My analysis consists of three parts. The first part studies the determinants of internal
versus external hire in light of the hiring models in labor economic theories. As
summarized by Oyer and Schaefer (2011), hiring is the outcome of a matching process
hindered by labor market frictions, such as asymmetric information, search costs, and
training costs. An external hire possesses skills and traits that are desirable for funds in
need of changing the status quo, but involves costly search and information asymmetry.
1

The literature on fund managerial turnover focuses primarily on how effectively mutual fund
families dismiss poorly performing managers. See, for example, Khorana (1996), Chevalier and
Ellison (1999a), Lynch and Musto (2003), Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005), Ding and Wermers
(2009), and Kostovetsky and Warner (2012). However, management changes can occur for reasons
other than discipline. For instance, well-performing managers may leave in pursuit of more attractive
job opportunities. Kostovetsky (2009) documents an increasing flight of top-performing managers
from mutual funds to hedge funds. Hu, Hall and Harvey (2000) also suggest that well-performing
managers can be promoted to a “better” (in their definition, larger) fund.
1

An internal hire provides the benefits of grooming the successor which greatly eases the
transition and promotes continued good performance. The training costs associated with
the grooming, however, can be non-trivial. The optimal choice of successor origin is
determined by trading off the benefits against the costs.
In support of the above arguments, I find that fund families prefer to replace their top
performers with internal hires and bottom performers with external hires, suggesting fund
families choose successors with traits to match the needs of the fund. Further, the
probability of hiring externally decreases with family size and predecessor tenure but
increases with fund family’s geographical proximity to a financial center. This finding
indicates training costs and search costs influence hiring decisions in the labor market of
mutual fund managers. I also find that publicly observable managerial traits, such as
industry experience and educational background, play a particularly important role in the
hiring of external managers since fund families must rely on more observable information
when evaluating the ability of these managers.
In the second part of my analysis, I examine the impact of successor origin on the
subsequent fund performance. To justify the incentive of mutual fund families to hire
externally, which is to turn around the poorly performing funds, I posit that external
successors should exhibit a superior ability to improve the poorly performing funds
compared to the internal ones. In contrast, when fund families replace a manager with an
internal candidate for the well-performing funds, the value of grooming will predict that
the internal successors are better at promoting continued good performance.
Consistent with my expectations, I find that over the subsequent three years, external
successors improve the annual abnormal performance (alpha) of the bottom-quartile
2

funds by 4.1% more than the internal ones do. When it comes to the top-quartile
performing funds, however, external successors deteriorate the performance by 2.6%
more than the internal ones do. This result is not simply driven by the mean-reversion in
fund performance. Further, in support of the premise that external hires are more likely to
change the job’s status quo, I show that external successors trade more frequently than
the internal ones and have a greater tendency to diverge from fund’s original investment
objectives. These findings remain after adjusting for the potential selection bias arising
from the fact that the impact of successor origin choice on fund performance can be
confounded by some unknown factors affecting the choice itself.
In the last part of my analysis, I exploit cross-sectional differences in the postturnover performance between internal and external hires. Taken together, the above
evidence confirms that there are benefits as well as costs associated with internal and
external replacement of mutual fund managers. The decision of whether to hire from
within or outside involves a trade-off between various benefits and costs. These benefits
and costs differ across the sample funds, and such differences predict variations in the
choice of successor origin. If the choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, we
should observe no cross-sectional difference in the post-turnover performance between
internal and external successors. Nevertheless, if, for some reason, a fund deviates from
the optimal choice, we would expect that the sub-optimal decision leads to subsequent
sub-par performance.
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find external successors produce risk-adjusted
returns that are indistinguishable from the ones produced by internal successors,
indicating fund families, in general, make their replacement decisions optimally. I do,
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however, find that funds that deviate from the expected decision (i.e. choose to internally
hire when external hire is expected or vice versa) have subsequent sub-par performance.
Further, I show that fund investors are cognizant of the deviation and punish such funds
by withdrawing their capital.
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, while the causes of managerial turnover
have been studied in the mutual fund literature, the consequences of this critical event
have not been carefully examined. Khorana (2001) finds that the performance of
underperforming (well-performing) funds significantly improves (deteriorates) after
managerial turnover using univariate comparisons. Kostovetsky and Warner (2012),
however, find no evidence of performance improvement after managerial turnover using
multivariate regression approach, raising doubts about fund families’ rationale for costly
turnover of their portfolio managers. In this study, I strive to capture replacement
decision more completely than previous research has and to enhance our understanding of
the economic incentive of managerial replacement decisions. The argument I advance
here is that it is not the manager turnover per se, but rather the succession decision that
impacts the subsequent fund performance. Without taking the nature of the succession
into account, the previous studies ignore an important part of the replacement decisions,
and therefore generate inconsistent findings.
Second, from a broader perspective, this paper aims to address the question of
whether portfolio managers play a pivotal role in generating mutual fund performance.
Popular press pays much attention to portfolio managers, reporting their profiles,
researching their investment philosophies, and tracking their job changes. The high media
coverage suggests that portfolio managers are critical to value creation for the fund. In
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addition, when mutual fund families describe their investment process, most of them
claim that the portfolio managers have the final say when it comes to buying or selling a
stock in the portfolio (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2012). Yet, existing empirical studies
typically rely on fund-, family-, and market-level characteristics to explain fund
performance and largely ignore the possible role that individual managers may play in
generating the performance outcomes. One of the reasons could be the widespread belief
that mutual fund managers lack stock picking skills. Starting with Jensen (1968), prior
studies consistently find actively managed mutual funds, on average, underperform their
benchmarks and therefore conclude that active managers do not have skills. Moreover,
while several papers find persistence in fund performance over short horizons of one to
three years,2 Carhart (1997) argues that the persistence of performance is largely driven
by the persistence in fees and momentum in stock returns.
A strand of recent literature, however, provides some evidence of managerial skill in
the mutual fund industry. For instance, Wermers (2000) finds that the stocks that mutual
funds hold outperform broad market indices. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find
that the stocks that mutual fund managers buy outperform the stocks that they sell.
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that the amount a fund deviates from its benchmark is
positively associated with fund performance. There is also evidence suggesting where the
skills come from. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and Gottesman and Morey
(2006) document a positive relation between manager educational background and fund
performance. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that geography matters as funds that
invest in more local stocks do better. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), and Huang
2

See, for example, Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), and
Brown and Goetzmann (1995).
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and Kale (2013) find that funds with better product market information perform better.
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) find that portfolio managers perform significantly
better on the holdings for which they are connected through social network. Agarwal,
Boyson, and Naik (2009) find that mutual fund managers with experience implementing
hedge fund strategies perform better. These studies suggest that managerial superior
performance is likely due to superior knowledge and information. These studies, however,
do not provide direct evidence on managers’ effects on fund performance. The superior
performance can be simply due to implementation of strategies that are chosen by fund
families. Since one can never observe performance outcomes of managers and funds
independently, but instead only in conjunction with each other (Baks, 2003), “the
empirical distinction between funds and managers need not be trivial” (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1999b).
In this paper, I take a new approach to investigate the extent to which portfolio
manager matters for fund performance by looking into the performance consequences
following managerial replacements. This identification strategy has two potential
advantages. First, by focusing on managerial replacements, I can compare the fund
performance before and after the event, which is a more direct way to quantify the effect
of different managers on fund performance. Second, in the setting of managerial
replacements, it is reasonable to argue that the funds and families stay the same, with the
managers being different. Thus, any change in fund performance should be more likely
due to the manager effect.
Third, my study adds to a growing body of labor economic literature that recognizes
the importance of hiring decisions in the labor market. While extensive theoretical work
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is devoted to understanding firms’ hiring decisions, few empirical studies underpin the
theoretical development.3 One obvious reason is data limitation. My work contributes to
this strand of literature by examining the empirical implications of hiring models using a
unique yet unexplored setting: labor market for mutual fund managers. The labor market
for mutual fund managers appears to be an attractive setting to study the hiring decision
for at least three reasons. First, the employment history of portfolio managers is
publically available, so tracking their personal traits is relatively easy. Second, there is a
direct link between managerial actions (investment decisions) and outcome (fund
performance), which allows me to clearly identify the impact of hiring on subsequent
fund performance. Last, but not least, mutual fund companies are human capital intensive
and hiring the right manager is an important (if not the most important) determinant of
their success (Barney, 1991).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II develops the hypotheses.
Section III describes the data, variable construction, and summary statistics. Section IV
presents the results on the determinants of successor origins. Section V examines the
impact of successor origin on the subsequent change in fund performance. Section VI
analyzes the cross-sectional difference in the post-turnover performance between internal
and external hires. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Hypotheses Development
A. Benefits

3

There is a reasonably large empirical literature on hiring decisions for chief executive officers (CEO).
Oyer and Schaefer (2011), however, claim that the market for CEOs is markedly different from other
rank-and-file employees and this literature needs more studies in other “specific labor markets”.
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Labor economists have long identified the main economic problem in any type of
hiring decisions (therefore succession decisions included) involves matching in the
presence of frictions in the labor market, such as asymmetric information, search costs,
and training costs (Oyer and Schaefer, 2011). Job matching theory (see among others,
Jovanovic, 1979a, 1979b; Rosen, 1982; Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen,
2013) suggests that there are neither good workers, nor are there good employers; there
are only good matches. Good matches are formed when firms with idiosyncratic needs
for employee skill sets hire a job candidate with the required set of skills. Good matches
are value-enhancing. In equilibrium, firms hire an external (internal) candidate when they
believe the attributes of the external (internal) candidate best match their specific needs
for the vacant job.
One well documented attribute that differentiates external candidates from internal
candidates is their ability to significantly change the job’s status quo (e.g., Parrino, 1997;
Khurana and Nohria, 2000; Allgood and Farrell, 2003; Jin and Scherbina, 2010; Pan and
Wang, 2012). On one hand, external candidates, by virtue of their experience at other
firms, are more likely to bring new ideas and fresh perspectives. On the other hand,
external candidates, who have zero contribution to the job’s status quo and no political
alliances with coworkers, are less constrained to implement those new ideas.
In the setting of mutual fund managers, job matching theory therefore suggests that a
key determinant of external hiring is fund performance. When the managerial turnover is
following a period of underperformance (most likely forced turnover of the predecessor),
fund companies prefer to hire externally so that the incoming manager brings new
perspectives and investment philosophies that help to turn around the bad performance.
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In contrast, internal hiring is more likely when the fund is performing well (most likely a
voluntary turnover of the predecessor) and therefore a continuation of good performance
is needed. In the case of internal replacements, the successor has the opportunity to obtain
“on-the-job training” from the predecessor. The “grooming” can greatly ease the manager
transition and promote continued good performance. The above argument forms the basis
of my first two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Mutual fund advisors are more likely to hire externally for the
underperforming funds and internally for the well-performing funds.
Hypothesis 2: External successors exhibit superior ability to turnaround the
underperforming funds, whereas internal successors demonstrate better ability to
maintain the good record of well-performing funds.
B. Costs
In a perfect labor market, the matching process leads to an ex-ante optimal managerfund match at all times. However, labor market frictions such as training costs and search
costs hinder the efficient matching. For instance, unlike large fund advisors such as
Fidelity, who have a complete internal training system (interns to buy-side analysts to
portfolio managers), smaller fund families, who have limited resources, may not be able
to afford the internal training costs. This limitation on internal talent can impede hiring
from within and thus reduce the incidence of internal replacements for smaller advisors.
By the same token, the supply of external candidates can play a key role in determining
the choice of successor origin. Fund advisors who are located in close proximity to the
financial centers such as Boston or New York have access to a larger pool of external
candidates, and thus are less constrained to hire from outside. The same argument,
9

however, cannot be made for advisors that are distant from those financial hubs. In
addition, predecessors who have longer tenure at the fund may have a greater opportunity
to groom their successors from inside the fund families. Thus, I expect greater likelihood
of internal succession for funds with longer-tenured predecessors. I formalize my third
hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 3: The probability of observing external replacements decreases with
family size and predecessor tenure but increases with advisor’s geographical proximity
to a financial center.
Another labor market friction, namely asymmetric information, may also impede
efficient matching (Greenwald, 1986). In general, asymmetric information refers to the
situation where two trading partners have different information about the economic
transaction. Regarding hiring in the labor market, asymmetric information arises when
job candidates have more information about their productivities than the firm does and
firms cannot costlessly verify the information. As a result, job candidates, the better
informed party, can exploit the information advantage at the expense of overall efficiency.
For instance, potential job candidates may misrepresent their quality by fabricating their
credentials or over-polishing their resumes.
Labor markets are, of course, heterogeneous. The extent to which asymmetric
information is prevalent is likely to vary. One can argue that asymmetric information is
less severe in the hiring decisions of portfolio managers since their past performance and
partial investment decisions are publically observable. However, Fama and French (2010)
claim that part of the fund performance can be attributed to luck rather than skill.
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Lakonishok et al. (1991), among others, show that portfolio managers can window-dress
their disclosed portfolio. Therefore, asymmetric information remains a concern.
Given the concern of information disadvantage, firms should prefer to hire
candidates about whom they have more accurate information on. As a result, internal
candidates have an advantage over external candidates in filling the vacant position,
ceteris paribus. This is because not only firms have more information about the internal
candidates: the information they have is also less noisy. One way firms can reduce the
uncertainty regarding external candidates is to require stronger observable indicators of
abilities. Though not an exhaustive list, such indictors include manager’s industry
experience and educational background. Both industry experience and educational
background are expected to be positively related to managerial ability for the following
three mutually non-exclusive reasons. First, managers with longer industry experience
and better educational background may have superior innate ability (Chevalier and
Ellison, 1999b). Because of the superior ability, they self-select to attend a better school
and are more likely to survive longer in the industry. Second, managers can obtain
knowledge from both the experience and the education, and thus enhance their trading
skills. Third, the social networks acquired through professional activities and schooling
may help managers obtain private information which in turn help the stock picking
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2007).
I summarize the above argument in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: External hires have stronger observable indicators of ability, such as
industry experience and educational background, than internal hires.
C. Costs/benefits Trade-off
11

Taken together, the above hypotheses suggest that there are benefits as well as costs
associated with both internal and external replacement of mutual fund managers. The
decision of whether to hire within the fund family or to search outside involves a tradeoff between various costs and benefits. These benefits and costs differ across the sample
funds, and such difference predicts variations in their choice of successor career origins.
If the choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, then we should observe no crosssectional difference in the subsequent performance between the internal and external
successors, after controlling for fund and manager characteristics. If internal (external)
hires produced systematically higher risk-adjusted returns than external (internal) ones,
we would expect all funds to hire internally (externally). The external (internal) hiring
mode will be completely competed out of the marketplace. This is, obviously, not
consistent with what we observe empirically. Thus, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: Internal successors produce risk-adjusted returns that are
indistinguishable from the risk-adjusted returns produced by external successors.
Note that this hypothesis is built on the assumption that mutual fund industry is
perfectly competitive. This may not be true as pointed out by Warner and Wu (2004).
Market frictions such as search and switching costs can deter investors from punishing
the funds. It is conceivable, then, some funds might deviate from the optimal decision
without being immediately competed out of the marketplace. If, for some reason, a fund
reaches a sub-optimal succession decision (i.e. choose to hire internally when external
hire is optimal or vice versa), we should expect this decision to lead to subsequent subpar performance. This argument leads to the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 6: The performance of funds that are predicted to have an external
(internal) hire and hired from outside (within) should outperform the ones are predicted
to have an external (internal) hire but hire from within (outside).
III. Data, Variable Construction, and Summary Statistics
A. Data
My primary data source is the Morningstar Direct Mutual Fund (Morningstar)
database. This survivorship-bias-free database covers the U.S. open-end mutual funds
and provides information about fund names, family names, returns, assets, expense ratios,
portfolio turnover ratios, manager names, manager biographies, investment objectives,
fund tickers, fund CUSIPs, and other fund characteristics. I rely primarily on the
Morningstar database rather than on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
Mutual Fund database for two reasons. First, manager name, a key input of this study, is
more accurate in the Morningstar database compared with the CRSP database (Massa,
Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 2010). Second, a short manager biography is provided to describe
each manager’s industry experience and educational background in the Morningstar
database. This information is not available in the CRSP database. My initial sample
consists of 4,096 U.S. open-end equity mutual funds managed by 7,686 portfolio
managers in 1,265 mutual fund companies, covering 33,014 fund-year observations
between 1996 and 2010.4
To construct the sample of funds with managerial replacement, I track the changes of
manager names to identify managerial turnover. I use the month in which at least one
4

Multiple share classes are listed as separate funds in the Morningstar database. To avoid multiple
counting, we aggregate the share-class level data to portfolio level, using the identifier, FundID.
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manager name is different from the one(s) in the previous month as the event month for
my empirical analyses. I exclude the cases when there are multiple managerial
replacements for one fund. To avoid cases of interim replacement, I require that (a) the
predecessor has at least 6-month tenure in the funds preceding the turnover, and (b) the
successor stays with the fund for at least 6 months after the replacement. I also require
information on the industry experience and educational background available for the
succeeding managers. Using this criterion, the replacement sample includes a total of
1,808 managerial replacement events.
B. Variable Constructions
B.1. Performance Measures
To evaluate the mutual fund performance, I use four-factor alpha (αi) estimated using
the Carhart (1997) model:

Ri ,t  R f ,t  i  i ,m ( Rm,t  R f ,t )  i ,s SMB  i ,h HML  i ,mom MOM t   i ,t

(1)

where Ri ,t  R f ,t is the return of the fund i in month t minus the risk free rate; and
Rm ,t  R f ,t is the excess return of the market over the risk free rate; SMB is the return

difference between small and large capitalization stocks; HML is the return difference
between high and low book-to-market stocks, and MOM is the return difference between
the stocks with high and low past returns.5 The factor loadings are calculated using fund
net-of-fee returns in the previous 36 months. The four-factor alpha has been widely used
in the literature to measure the risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds.

5

I thank Professor Kenneth French for making the returns on the market, risk-free rate, and the three
factors (size, book-to-market, and momentum) available on his website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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As a robustness check, I also compute the category-adjusted return which equals the
monthly fund return less the average monthly return of all the funds in the corresponding
Morningstar Category. The use of the category-adjusted return is consistent with the
argument that, in making managerial replacement decisions, mutual fund companies
benchmark a manager’s performance against the performance of “similar” funds in the
industry. All of my results are robust to this alternative performance measure. Both the
statistical and economic significance are consistent and qualitatively similar.
B.2. Flows Measures
I construct my net flows measure following Sirri and Tufano (1998). It is defined as
the growth in total net assets (TNA) net of internal return as in equation (2), assuming all
dividends and other distributions are reinvested at the realized annual return for the fund.
Berk and Tonks (2007) claim that the way Sirri and Tufano (1998) construct net flows is
incorrect because it attributes some of the change in flows to the change due to internal
growth. They propose a new measure of net flows where it has TNAi,t-1 (1+ri,t) rather than
TNAi,t-1 in the denominator. My results are consistent and qualitatively similar, no matter
which measure I employ.
NetFlowsi ,t 

TNAi ,t  TNAi ,t 1 (1  ri ,t )
TNAi ,t 1

(2)

B.3. Successor Attributes
Successor attributes are hand-collected from managers’ biographies provided by the
Morningstar database. Three publicly observable managerial traits are considered in the
paper. The first one is career origin which refers to whether the new manager comes
from inside or outside the mutual fund companies. A manager is categorized to be
15

external successor if she is hired from outside the fund company and internal if she is
hired from within. Another important managerial characteristic is industry experience
which is defined as the number of years that a manager has been working in the asset
management industry. Three variables are generated to capture manager’s educational
background. The first is the median composite SAT score (as of 2010) for the manager’s
undergraduate institution. Most schools report upper and lower bounds for the reading,
math, and writing sections. The bounds are supposed to be constructed so that the median
students lie in between. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), I approximate each
school’s composite SAT score as the sum of the average of the upper and lower bounds
for the three sections. The second variable is the median composite GMAT score (as of
2010) of the graduate institution attended by the manager, if available, following
Gottesman and Morey (2006).6 Lastly, I construct an MBA dummy that equals one if the
successor has an M.B.A. degree and zero otherwise. These three variables of managerial
educational background are used to proxy the manager’s innate ability, connections, and
the quality of her training.
The following is an example that illustrates how I obtain the information on
successor attributes. In November 2009, T. Rowe Price replaced its veteran manager
Charles Ober with Timothy Parker, an equity analyst at T. Rowe Price, for the New Era
Fund. In Morningstar database, a short biography is provided for Timothy Parker. It says
that “Mr. Parker joined the Firm in 2001. He has served as an equity research analyst and
then a portfolio manager (beginning in 2010)”. From the biography, I also learn that Mr.

6

To construct the composite SAT score, I mainly use the website: http://www.collegeboard.org/. To
obtain the composite GMAT score, I mainly use the website: http://businessschools.collegescholarships.com/. I also use some schools’ websites as supplementary data sources.
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Parker earned an M.B.A. degree as well as a B.S. degree from University of Virginia.
Based on the above sketches, I conclude that Timothy Parker is an internal successor, has
10 years of industry experience, and went to an M.B.A program that requires median
GMAT score of 680 and an undergraduate institution with 2,040 median composite SAT
score requirement.
B.4. Other Variables
Other variables are defined as follows. Fund Assets is the market value of assets held
by the fund at the end of each month. Expense Ratio equals the fund’s operating expenses
divided by the average monthly assets. Portfolio Turnover Ratio is computed by taking
the lesser of purchases or sales by the fund and dividing it by the average monthly net
assets. Family Assets is the market value of assets held by all the equity funds in the
family at the end of each month. Team is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund
is managed by a team of portfolio managers and zero otherwise. Tenure is the number of
years that a manager has been at the helm of a mutual fund.
C. Summary Statistics
On average, 1.3% of portfolio managers get replaced each month which translates
into an annual manager turnover rate of 15.6%. While mutual fund families mainly rely
on the internal labor markets to fill their staffing needs (68.1% of the sample), a
significant fraction of positions are filled from the outside (31.9%).
[Insert Table I about here]
Table I reports the summary statistics of the characteristics for all the sample funds.
A typical fund in my sample has annualized four-factor alpha of -0.54% and category-
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adjusted return of -0.45%. On average, the sample fund has an expense ratio of 1.34%
and portfolio turnover ratio of 112.28%. The annual net flows are on average 8.4% of the
fund assets. Fund assets and family assets are positively skewed, thus I use the natural
logarithm of these two variables in all my empirical tests.
As far as the manager characteristics are concerned, a typical sample fund has about
two team members running the fund. Portfolio managers in my sample have been
working in the asset management industry for an average 13 years. The average tenure of
the portfolio managers is 4.5 years. About 77% of my sample managers hold an M.B.A.
degree. The average GMAT score of managers’ graduate institutions is about 668 and the
average SAT score of managers’ undergraduate institutions is about 1,881. All the
variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile levels.
[Insert Table II about here]
Table II reports the sample distribution by Morningstar Category. Morningstar
Category is assigned based on the underlying securities in the fund over the previous
three years. The majority of funds in my sample are Large-Cap funds which represent
54.6% of the sample. The sample also consists of Mid-Cap funds (23.1%) and Small-Cap
funds (21.1%). I also have 23 Sector funds in the sample, which represent 1% of the
sample. There are 297 cases (16.4% of the sample funds) where managers change the
investment objectives of the funds in the subsequent three years after the replacement
event. As a result, the Morningstar Category in the post-turnover period is different from
the one in the pre-turnover period. I refer to this event as “style drift” in the study. The
variable Style Drift is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund changes its investment
objective in the three years after the manager turnover, and zero otherwise.
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[Insert Table III about here]
As shown in Table III, the management companies’ locations span most of the major
financial centers. I first rank cities by the number of fund families that are located in each
for all the domestic equity funds in the Morningstar database. As can be seen, New York
and Boston dominate the mutual fund landscape. There are 189 (14.9%) and 152 (12.0%)
mutual fund families in New York and Boston, respectively. Other major mutual fund
cities include Chicago (5.7%), Philadelphia (63%), San Francisco (4.0%), Los Angeles
(3.2%), Milwaukee (2.8%), Baltimore (2.8%), and Houston (2.8%). The rest of the
mutual fund families are lumped together in “Rest of Cities”; this category comprises
46.9% of the sample. Similar pattern can be found for the sample of funds with
managerial replacement. To measure the geographical advantage of accessing external
talent, I construct the indicator variable, Financial Center, which equals one if the mutual
fund family is located in those top 10 cities and zero if it is located in the rest of cities.
D. Univariate Comparisons
Table IV presents a univariate comparison of various fund characteristics between
internal successors and external successors. Overall, the descriptive evidence reveals
significant differences in fund characteristics between the two groups. In the pre-turnover
period, funds that choose to hire externally underperform the ones that acquired by an
internal successor. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Compared with the
internal successors, external ones tend to acquire smaller, more expensive, and active
funds. Notably, consistent with Hypothesis 3, both the family size and the predecessor
tenure are greater for funds with internal successors than the ones with external hires.
Lastly, I find that consistent with my expectations in Hypothesis 4, compared with
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internal succession, external succession requires the incoming manager to have stronger
observable indicators of ability, such as longer industry experience and better educational
background, which presumably reduce the information uncertainty.
[Insert Table IV about here]
IV. Determinants of Successor Origin
As the first step in my analysis, I investigate the determinants of successor career
origin (i.e. internal versus external hire). As discussed in the Hypotheses Development
section, a key determinant of external hiring should be fund performance. When the
managerial turnover is following a period of underperformance, fund companies are more
likely to hire externally so that the incoming manager bring new perspective and
investment philosophies that help to turn around the bad performance. In contrast,
internal hire is more likely when the fund is performing well and therefore continuation
of good performance is needed, as the successor has the opportunity to obtain “grooming”
from the predecessor which greatly eases the transition and promotes continued good
performance.
Mutual fund families are heterogeneous and face different costs associated with
internal and external recruiting. Smaller families have greater training costs, thus are less
likely to hire from within. Fund families that are located in close proximity to the
financial centers have access to a larger pool of external candidates, therefore are less
constrained to hire from outside. Predecessors who have longer tenure at the fund may
have a greater opportunity to groom their successors from inside the fund families. Thus,
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I expect greater likelihood of internal succession for funds with longer-tenured
predecessors.
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3, I employ a probit regression modeling the
likelihood of a fund whose manager gets replaced by an external candidate at time t. The
probit model specification is as follows:

yi*,t  1Perfi ,t 1  2Tenurei ,t 1  3 FamSizei ,t 1  4 FinCenteri ,t 1   Controlsi ,t 1   i ,t

(3)

yi ,t  1 [ yi*,t  0]
where i indexes mutual funds and t indexes time. The dependent variable yi ,t is an
indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if she is
an internal successor. I first measure the past fund performance as the four-factor alpha
defined in Section III, over the past 36 months. To test the possibility that the relation
between the past performance and the choice of successor origin is not linear, I also use
the relative performance as alternative performance measure.
I divide the sample into three groups based on the fund’s previous three year’s
performance. The top performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in
the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes the funds whose performance
ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance quartiles are combined into
one group. Top, Bottom, and Middle are indicator variables that equal one if the fund
performance belongs to the top, bottom, or middle performance group, respectively, and
zero otherwise. Note that the indicator variable Middle is not included in the regression
because the middle group serves as the base case for the top and bottom groups. The
estimated coefficients for Top and Bottom show the effects of being top and bottom
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performers on the likelihood of external replacement relative to being the middle
performers, respectively. I control for other fund and manager characteristics including
fund assets, expense ratio, portfolio turnover ratio, and whether a fund is managed by a
team of managers or not. All the independent variables are measured one month prior to
the turnover event. I include both the category dummies and year dummies in the
regression, and cluster the standard errors at the fund level.
[Insert Table V about here]
I report the results in Table V. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the estimated
coefficient on variable Four-factor Alpha is negative (Coef. =-0.033) and significant at
the 1% level, suggesting that fund families are more likely to choose an external hire over
an internal hire for an underperforming fund.

This finding is further confirmed in

Column (2). The coefficient on the indicator variable Bottom is 0.761 and significant at
the 1% level. In contrast, the coefficient on the indicator variable Top is -0.139,
significant at the 10% level, suggesting internal (external) replacements are preferable for
well (poorly)-performing funds. An F-test of equality of the coefficients on Top and
Bottom is strongly rejected at 1% significance level. In terms of the economic magnitude,
for a typical fund in the sample, one-standard-deviation decrease in the Four-factor Alpha
is associated with an increase in the probability of external hire by 13.9%. A change of
ranking from the middle quartiles to the bottom (top) quartile is associated with an
increase (decrease) in the implied probability of external replacement by 27.9% (4.4%).
Further, the implied probability of external hire by keeping all fund characteristics at the
mean level is only 29.3%, suggesting ceteris paribus, fund families prefer internal hire
over external hire.

22

Consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find that the coefficient on the natural logarithm of
family size to be negative (Coef. =-0.060) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting
external hiring is associated with smaller fund families. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the natural logarithm of family size is associated with a decrease in the
probability of external hire by 4.5%. I also find that the coefficient on the predecessor
tenure is negative (Coef. =-0.032) and significant at the 1% level. This finding is
consistent with the idea that longer-tenured predecessors are more likely to groom an
internal candidate to be the succeeding managers. Further, the coefficient on the dummy
variable Financial Center is positive (Coef. =0.687) and significant at the 1% level. This
finding confirms that fund families that are located in close proximity to the financial
centers are more likely to hire externally. I do not find any significant difference between
internal and external hire for their distribution patterns in categories or years.
V. Successor Origin and Change in Performance
Having examined the determinants of successor origin, I now turn to examine its
impact on the subsequent fund performance. To justify the incentive for mutual fund
families to hire externally, which is to turn around the poorly performing funds, I posit
that external successors should exhibit a superior ability to improve the bottom
performing funds compared to the internal ones. In contrast, when fund families replace a
manager with an internal candidate for the well-performing funds, the value of grooming
will predict that the internal successors are better at promoting continued good
performance.
To test the above predictions, I divide the sample into three groups based on the
fund’s previous three year’s performance. The top performance group includes the funds
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whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes
the funds whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance
quartiles are combined into one group. For each of the subsample, I run the following test:

Perfi ,t  1Externali ,t   Controlsi ,t 1   i ,t

(4)

where i indexes mutual funds, and t indexes time. The dependent variable Perf is the
change of fund performance from the pre-replacement period (i.e., month t-36 to t-1) to
the post-replacement period (i.e., month t+1 to t+36). To ascertain that the post-turnover
improvement or deterioration in fund performance is related to true managerial ability
rather than mean reversion in fund performance, I employ a matched-sample-based
performance measure. For each fund in my sample, I identify a fund with similar
performance record over the 36-month period preceding the turnover event and with
same investment style, but does not experience management shakeup in the subsequent
period. I then subtract the change in performance of the matched sample from the
corresponding change in performance for the replacement sample fund.
The independent variable of interest External equals one if a succeeding manager is
hired from outside the fund family and zero if she is hired from within. The regression
controls for other fund characteristics such as fund size, expense ratio, portfolio turnover
ratio, family size, team management, successor’s experience, and successor’s educational
background. 7 I include both the category dummies and year dummies, and cluster the
standard errors at the fund level.

7

Note that I did not include the interaction of External and Experience (or Education) because the
interaction terms and External is highly collinear.
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One possible source of bias in regression (4) is that the choice of the successor types
is not random. Since the selection process of the successors is unobserved, the impact of
successor types on fund performance could be confounded by some unknown factors
affecting the choice of the successor types. I deal with this selection problem by
employing a treatment effect model à la Heckman two-step method. The first stage of the
model is a probit specification as in equation (3) that analyzes how fund families make
the choice of the successor career origin. The estimated parameters are used to calculate
the selection hazard Inverse Mills Ratio, which is then included as an additional
explanatory variable in regression of (4).
[Insert Table VI about here]
The results are reported in Table VI. Consistent with the incentive for mutual fund
families to hire externally, I find that external successors demonstrate better ability to
improve the performance of the poorly performing funds. Compared with internal
successors, external ones improve the annual four-factor alpha for the bottom performers
by 4.1% over the subsequent three-year window, significant at the 1% level. Similar
effect can be found for the middle quartile group. For the sample of top-performing funds,
however, external successors exhibit inferior ability to continue the good performance.
On average, the external successors decrease the annual four-factor alpha for the top
performers by 2.6% more than the internal ones do, which is significant at the 1% level.
Overall, external successors, compared to the internal ones, have a greater tendency to
change the fund’s performance. The results for the entire sample are reported in the last
column. The inverse mills ratio for the choice of external successors is significant at the 1%
level. This indicates that the difference in subsequent change in performance between
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internal and external successors is partially driven by the selection process. Therefore,
throughout the paper, I control for the selection bias in my empirical specifications by
including the Inverse Mills Ratio that estimated from equation (3).
To further test the channel through which external hires change the fund’s status quo,
I compare the level of trading activities between internal and external hires. I measure the
level of trading activity using two variables. The first variable, Style Drift, is an indicator
variable that takes a value of one if a fund changes its investment objective from the preturnover period to the post-turnover period, and zero otherwise. Style drift occurs when a
fund diverges from its original investment style and is mostly caused by intentional asset
reallocation by the portfolio managers. The second variable is the annual portfolio
turnover ratio in the post-replacement period. It is defined as the percentage of fund
holdings that have been replaced with other holdings in a given year. It is computed by
taking the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities of less than
one year) and dividing by average monthly net assets. It is reported on an annual basis
and can be retrieved from mutual fund’s financial highlights in the annual report.
I use similar probit regression as in equation (3) to model the tendency to drift in
style and use similar OLS specification as in equation (4) to model the difference in
trading frequencies between internal versus external hires.
[Insert Table VII about here]
I report the results in Table VII. Consistent with my predictions, I find that external
successors trade more frequently than the internal ones and are more likely to diverge
from fund’s original investment style. The estimated slope coefficients on External are
both positive and highly significant. These findings support the premise that external
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managers have a greater tendency to change the fund’s status quo. Not surprisingly, I also
find bad performance leads to more active trading in the subsequent period. Results also
suggest that a manager’s undergraduate quality is another variable that is positively
related to the trading activity.
VI. Successor Origin and Cross-sectional Performance
As discussed in the Hypothesis Development section, there are benefits as well as
costs associated with external and internal succession of mutual fund managers. The
decision of whether to hire within or to search outside involves a trade-off between
various costs and benefits. These benefits and costs differ across the sample funds, and
such difference predicts variations in their choice of successor career origins. If the
choice is optimally determined in equilibrium, then we should observe no cross-sectional
difference in the subsequent performance between the internal and external successors,
after controlling for fund and manager characteristics.
If for some reason, however, a fund reaches a sub-optimal succession decision (e.g.
replacing its managers internally when the costs of internal hire are high and the benefits
are minimal), we would expect that this deviation from the optimal decision leads to
subsequent sub-par performance for the fund.
To test the above two hypotheses, I employ the following empirical specification:

Perfi ,t  1Externali ,t ( Deviationi,t )   Controlsi ,t 1   i,t

(5)

where i indexes mutual funds and t indexes time. The dependent variable Perf is fund
performance in the post-replacement period (i.e., month t+1 to t+36). The first variable
of interst is External that is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an
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external successor and zero if she is an internal successor. The second variable of interest
is Deviation from the expected decision, which is measured by the absolute difference
between the actual decision of the manager origin (0 or 1) and the predicted probability
generated from probit regression (3). The intuition is illustrated in the following example.
One of the funds in my sample has a sub-par performance during the past three years
(Four-factor Alpha=-14.5%), belongs to a small fund family (Ln Family Assets=20.9),
and is located in New York (Fin Center=1). In the probit regression (3), this fund is
predicted to have a probability of 68.3% to hire externally. If indeed, the succesor is hired
from outside the firm (i.e. External=1), the deviation measure will be 31.7%. If, however,
the successor is hired from within (i.e. External=0), the deviation measure will be 68.3%.
Greater value of the deviation measure suggests further distance from the predicted
decision, and therefore may negatively affect the fund performance. To help to ease the
concern of nonlinearity of the relation between fund performance and deviation, I also
contruct a deviation dummy that equals one if the deviation is greater than the 50%, and
zero otherwise. I also controlled for other variables that might affect the fund
performance. These variables include the manager’s industry experience and educational
background, the fund’s past performance, family size, financial center, fund size, expense
ratio, portfolio turnover ratio, team management and category as well as year dummies.
The standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
[Insert Table VIII about here]
The results are reported in Table VIII. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the estimated
coefficient on External in column one is insignificant, suggesting no cross-sectional
difference in the post-turnover performance between the internal and external successors.
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The coefficient on the indicator variable External is -0.126 and it is not statistically
significant at the conventional level (p-value=66.4%). The coefficient on the deviation
from the predicted probability, however, is negative (Coef. =-1.336) and significant at the
5% level, suggesting deviation from the optimal decision leads to subsequent sub-par
performance for the fund. Similar conclusion can be made if I use the deviation dummy
variable instead. Further, the quality of the successor’s undergraduate institution
positively relates to the post-turnover performance.

This confirms the idea that

manager’s education background is positively related to their innate ability of stock
picking.
As the last step of the analysis, I compare the difference in the net flows between
internal and external successions. In particular, I aim to test when funds execute a suboptimal succession decision that is far away from investor’s expectation, whether
investors punish the funds by withdrawing their money. The empirical specification is
similar to the one used in regression (5) except the dependent variable is net flows
defined as in equation (2), instead of fund performance. To account for the convex flowperformance relation (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), I include an additional control variable
which is the quadratic term of the fund’s past performance.
[Insert Table IX about here]
The results are reported in Table IX. I find no significant difference in net flows
between internal and external successions. The coefficient on the indicator variable
External is -0.195 and it is not statistically significant at the conventional level (pvalue=27.9%). However, when the funds deviate from their predicted choice, investors
punish the fund by withdrawing their capital. The coefficient on the Deviation from
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predicted probability is -5.146, significant at the 5% level. I find similar results when I
use the alternative deviation dummy variable.
VII. Conclusion
Departing from prior literature on portfolio manager turnover which largely focuses
on the firing decisions, this paper highlights the importance of the hiring decisions. The
results suggest that it is not the manager turnover per se, but rather the succession
decisions that impact the subsequent fund performance. By shifting the focus to the
choice of the successors, I extend previous research and enhance our understanding of the
economic incentives of managerial replacement decisions. In particular, the evidence
suggests that the match between the successor and the fund is influenced by the needs of
the fund and the manager’s attributes, and manager attributes in turn play a key role in
determining the subsequent fund performance.
Another objective of this paper is to address the question of whether portfolio
managers are important in generating mutual fund performance. Portfolio managers are
heterogeneous in background, experience, innate abilities, and investment philosophies.
Thus, some of them will be a better “fit” with a fund than others. Prior studies have
suggested that the empirical identification of manager heterogeneity and its effect on fund
performance is challenging as one can never observe the manager effect and fund effect
separately. I present an empirical framework to analyze this issue by looking into the
performance consequences following managerial replacements. In this setting, it is
reasonable to argue that the fund stays the same, with the managers being different. Thus,
any change in fund performance should be more likely due to the manager effect. I find,
compared with their counterparts, successors that come from outside the fund families
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demonstrate better ability to improve the performance of the bottom performers but
inferior ability to maintain the performance of the top performers. Overall, the evidence
suggests that portfolio managers play a pivotal role in determining mutual fund
performance.
While extensive theoretical work is devoted to understanding firms’ hiring decisions,
relatively few empirical studies underpin the theoretical development. My work
contributes to the labor economics literature by testing some of the implications of the
hiring model using a unique yet unexplored setting: the labor market for mutual fund
managers. This study provides evidence on how firms find the right employees in the first
place. By doing so, it also sheds light on the importance of hiring decisions in the
managerial labor market.
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics (Panel A) and the correlation matrix (Panel B) of the characteristics for all
the 1,808 sample funds. The sample period is between 1996 and 2010. Four-factor Alpha equals the average
annulized four-factor alpha as defined in equation (1) over the previous three years. Categoty-adj. Return is equal to
the average annual fund return less the average annual return of all the funds in the corresponding Morningstar
Category, over the prior three years. Fund Assets is the market value of assets held by the fund by the end of the
month. Ln Fund Assets is the natural logarithm of one plus Fund Assets. Expense Ratio equals the fund’s operating
expenses divided by the average monthly assets. Turnover Ratio is computed by taking the lesser of purchases or
sales by the fund and divided it by the average monthly net assets. Net Flows is defined as in equation (2), which is
the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends. Family Assets is the market value of assets held by all the
equity funds in the family by the end of each month. Ln Family Assets is the natural logarithm of one plus Family
Assets. Predecessor Tenure is the number of years that the predecessor has been at the helm of the mutual fund.
Successor Experience is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry.
SAT is the median composite SAT score (as of 2010) reported by the manager’s undergraduate institution. GMAT is
the median composite GMAT score (as of 2010) of new entrants at the graduate institution attended by the manager.
MBA is a dummy variable that equals one if the manager has an M.B.A degree and zero otherwise. All variables are
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile levels. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by
***,**, and * respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics

Variables
Fund Characteristics
Four-factor Alpha (%)
Category-adj. Return (%)
Ln Fund Assets
Expense Ratio (%)
Turnover Ratio (%)
Net Flows (%)
Ln Family Assets
Manager Characteristics
Predecessor Tenure
Successor Experience
SAT/100
GMAT/100
MBA

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

25%

Median

Quartiles
75%

-0.54
-0.45
18.32
1.34
112.28
8.35

11.4
5.77
2.26
0.43
88.94
34.73

-30.5
-19.74
15.03
0.37
3.9
-65.13

-4.97
-3.03
16
1.01
55
-9.29

-1.85
-0.45
18.28
1.32
94
-2.93

1.45
2.01
20.18
1.6
141
18.38

65.66
18.5
23.53
2.53
560
174.72

21.74

2.36

16.4

20

21.43

23.52

26.66

4.49
13
18.81
6.68
0.77

3.53
7.35
2.4
0.66
0.42

1
2
13
5
0

2
7
17.4
6.33
1

3.25
12
19.05
6.91
1

5.83
19
20.9
7.19
1

18.75
34
22.35
7.3
1
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Max

Panel B: Correlation Matrix
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Four-factor Alpha (1)

1

Cat-adj. Return (2)

0.37***

1

Ln Fund Assets (3)

-0.002

0.15

1

Expense Ratio (4)

0.004

-0.07***

-0.62***

1

Turnover Ratio (5)

0.03

-0.007

-0.08***

0.14***

1

Net Flows (6)

0.23***

0.22***

-0.10***

0.02

0.02

1

Ln Family Assets (7)

0.02

0.09***

0.56***

-0.22***

-0.01

-0.05**

1

Tenure (8)

-0.09***

0.03

0.24***

-0.09***

-0.17***

-0.16***

0.08***

1

Experience (9)

-0.09***

-0.06**

-0.04*

-0.01

-0.04*

-0.03

-0.07**

-0.003

1

SAT (10)

-0.01

0.01

0.03

0.01

0.04**

0.06***

0.09***

-0.05**

0.05**

1

GMAT (11)

-0.02

-0.02

0.08**

-0.03

0.01

-0.01

0.12***

-0.006

0.09***

0.33***

1

MBA (12)

-0.02

0.01

0.06**

-0.02

-0.03

-0.02

0.01

0.02

-0.007

-0.04*

-0.06**
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(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1

Table II
Sample Distribution by Category and Year
This table reports the sample distribution by Morningstar Category (Panel A) and Event Year (Panel B). The
Morningstar Category is assigned based on the underlying securities in each fund over the previous three years. The
Event Year is the year that the sample fund experiences managerial replacement. The sample consists of 1,808
observations over the period of 1996-2010.
Panel A
Morningstar Cat.

Total Funds

External

Large-Cap Blend
Large-Cap Growth
Large-Cap Value
Mid-Cap Blend
Mid-Cap Growth
Mid-Cap Value
Small-Cap Blend
Small-Cap Growth
Small-Cap Value
Sector
Total

378
311
298
95
241
81
110
190
81
23
1,808

108
87
96
26
78
27
45
63
34
13
577

Percentage
28.6%
28.0%
32.2%
27.4%
32.4%
33.3%
40.9%
33.2%
42.0%
56.5%
31.9%

Internal
270
224
202
69
163
54
65
127
47
10
1,231

Percentage
71.4%
72.0%
67.8%
72.6%
67.6%
66.7%
59.1%
66.8%
58.0%
43.5%
68.1%

Panel B
Year

Total Funds

External

Percentage

Internal

Percentage

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

91
90
92
126
133
105
109
127
119
141
138
158
158
108
113
1,808

30
31
32
47
39
39
36
45
46
51
53
42
41
18
27
577

33.0%
34.4%
34.8%
37.3%
29.3%
37.1%
33.0%
35.4%
38.7%
36.2%
38.4%
26.6%
25.9%
16.7%
23.9%
31.9%

61
59
60
79
94
66
73
82
73
90
85
116
117
90
86
1,231

67.0%
65.6%
65.2%
62.7%
70.7%
62.9%
67.0%
64.6%
61.3%
63.8%
61.6%
73.4%
74.1%
83.3%
76.1%
68.1%
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Table III
Cities Ranked by Number of Fund Families (1996-2010)
This table reports summary statistics on the distribution across cities of those fund families in my sample from 1996
to 2010. I rank cities by the number of fund families that are located in each for all the U.S.-based stock funds (i.e.
my initial sample) and the statistics (both #Obs. and %) for this sample are reported in column (1) and (2). I report
the same statistics in column (3) and (4) for the sample of funds that experience manager turnovers (i.e. my final
sample). There are 1,265 mutual fund families in my intial sample and 488 mutual fund families in my final sample.
Only the top-10 cities are reported, and the rest of the mutual fund families are lumped together in “Rest of Cities”.

All Sample
City
New York
Boston
Chicago
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Milwaukee
Baltimore
Houston
Rest of Cities
Total

(1)
# Obs.
189
152
72
63
51
40
36
35
34
593
1,265

(2)
Percentage
14.9%
12.0%
5.7%
5.0%
4.0%
3.2%
2.8%
2.8%
2.8%
46.9%
100.0%
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Replacement Sample
(3)
(4)
# Obs.
Percentage
15.0%
73
11.7%
57
4.5%
22
7.0%
34
2.7%
13
3.1%
15
2.0%
10
2.3%
11
2.5%
12
49.2%
240
100.0%
488

Table IV
Univariate Comparisions: Internal versus External Hire
This table compares the characteristics of the sample funds that hire an internal successor (i.e. hire within the fund
family) with the ones that hire an external successor (i.e. hire outside the fund family). The differences between the
characteristics of the internal and external hire samples are reported in the last column. The variables are defined in
Table I. The standard errors from the t-tests are clustered by fund. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.

Variables
#Obs.
Pre-turnover Characteristics
Four-factor Alpha t-1 (%)
Category-adj. Return t-1 (%)
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1 (%)
Turnover Ratio t-1 (%)
Net Flows t-1 (%)
Ln Family Assets t-1
Predecessor Tenure t-1
Post-turnover Characteristics
Four-factor Alpha t+1 (%)
Category-adj. Return t+1 (%)
Ln Fund Assets t+1
Expense Ratio t+1 (%)
Turnover Ratio t+1 (%)
Net Flows t+1 (%)
Ln Family Assets t+1
Successor Tenure t+1
Successor Experience t
SAT/100
GMAT/100
MBA

Internal
1,231

External
577

Difference

1.24
0.20
18.52
1.31
108.24
8.63
21.92
4.69

-4.34
-1.82
17.91
1.39
120.89
7.76
21.34
4.06

5.58***
2.02***
0.61***
-0.08***
-12.65**
0.87
0.58***
0.63***

-1.65
-0.15
19.94
1.32
113.25
0.86
22.54
4.71
11.68
18.68
6.60
0.74

-2.24
0.11
19.41
1.43
127.89
0.39
22.01
4.98
15.78
19.09
6.80
0.83

0.59**
-0.26
0.53***
-0.11***
-14.64***
0.47
0.53***
-0.27*
-4.1***
-0.41***
-0.2***
-0.09***
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Table V
Determinants of Successor Origin
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the probit regressions modeling the choice bwtween hiring the
successors within (internal hire) versus outside (external hire) the fund family. The model is specified as in equation
(3). The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if
she is an internal successor. In column (1), I measure the performance by four-factor alpha. In column (2), I divide
the sample into three groups based on the fund’s previous three year’s performance. The top performance group
includes the funds whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom performance group includes the funds
whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance quartiles are combined into one group.
Top, Bottom, and Middle Quartile are indicator variables that equal one if the fund performance belongs to the top,
bottom, or middle performance group, respectively, and zero otherwise. Note that the indicator variable Middle
Quartile is not included in the regression because the middle group serves as the base case for the top and bottom
groups. All the other independent variables are defined in Table I and measured one month prior to the turnover
event. All specifications include category dummies and year dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund
level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.
Dependent Variable: External Hire
(1)
(2)

Variables
Four-factor Alpha t-1

-0.033***
(-5.801)

Top t-1

-0.139*

-0.032***
(-3.138)
-0.060***
(-3.488)
0.687***
(9.606)
-0.019
(-0.991)
0.138*
(1.695)
0.001*
(1.800)
-0.001
(-0.006)
Yes
Yes

(-1.864)
0.761***
(9.434)
-0.027***
(-2.587)
-0.060***
(-3.516)
0.663***
(9.170)
-0.009
(-0.467)
0.069
(0.845)
0.001
(0.467)
0.020
(0.139)
Yes
Yes

1,808
13.2%

1,808
14.2%

Bottom t-1
Predecessor Tenure t-1
Ln Family Assets t-1
Financial Center t-1
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1
Turnover Ratio t-1
Team Mgmt. t-1
Category Dummies
Year Dummies
#Obs.
Pseudo R2
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Table VI
Successor Origin and Change in Performance
This table presents the results from the second stage Treatment Effect regressions modeling the impact of successor
career origin on the change in fund performance. The model is specified as in equation (4). The dependent variable
is the change of fund performance from pre-replacement period (i.e., month t-36 to t-1) to post-replacement period
(i.e., month t+1 to t+36). Based on the fund’s previous three-year performance, I divide the sample into three groups.
The top performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in the first quartile. The bottom
performance group includes the funds whose performance ranks in the bottom quartile. The middle two performance
quartiles are combined into one group. The estimated coefficients for the Top, Mid and Bottom groups are reported
in column (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The last column (4) reports the estimated coefficient for the overall sample.
External is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager is an external successor and zero if she is an internal
successor. Other independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications include category dummies and year
dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.

Variables
External
Experience
SAT/100
MBA
Ln Family Assets t-1
Financial Center t-1
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1
Turnover Ratio t-1
Team Mgmt. t-1
Inverse Mills Ratio
Category Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
Adj. R2

(1)
Top

Dependent Variable: Δ Performance
(2)
(3)
Mid
Bottom

(4)
All

-2.618**
(-2.547)
0.008
(0.132)
0.090
(0.647)
-1.101
(-1.218)
1.559***
(7.847)
-18.418***
(-13.132)
0.654**
(1.993)
-4.578***
(-4.417)
-0.034***
(-6.541)
-0.009
(-0.007)
-33.747***
(-13.402)

1.142***
(2.800)
-0.037*
(-1.809)
0.116*
(1.961)
0.897**
(2.322)
0.017
(0.140)
-1.034
(-1.053)
0.038
(0.371)
-1.279**
(-2.534)
0.006
(1.519)
-1.936***
(-3.054)
-2.111
(-1.160)

4.118***
(4.159)
-0.062
(-1.003)
0.284
(1.633)
1.155
(1.381)
1.413***
(5.761)
-18.271***
(-8.897)
1.298***
(5.166)
-6.063***
(-5.828)
-0.025***
(-4.837)
2.264
(0.964)
-41.316***
(-11.472)

1.678***
(3.799)
-0.021
(-0.731)
0.122*
(1.785)
0.516
(1.375)
1.446***
(15.887)
-18.162***
(-22.062)
0.806***
(6.074)
-5.422***
(-11.045)
-0.023***
(-8.891)
-0.603
(-0.738)
-36.057***
(-23.112)

Yes
Yes
452
76%

Yes
Yes
904
12%

Yes
Yes
452
50%

Yes
Yes
1,808
68%
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Table VII
Successor Origin and Trading Activity
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Probit and OLS regressions modeling the impact of successor
career origin on the level of fund’s trading activity. The dependent variable Style Drift in column (1) and (2) is a
dummy variable that equals one if a fund changes its investment objective from pre-turnover period to post-turnover
period and zero otherwise. The dependent variable Port. Turnover column (3) and (4) is the annual turnover ratio in
the post-replacement period (i.e. month t+1 to t+12). It is defined as the percentage of fund holdings that have been
replaced with other holdings in a given year. The independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications
include category dummies and year dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical
significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.
Style Drift
Variables
External
Experience
SAT/100
MBA
Four-factor Alpha t-1
Ln Family Assets t-1
Financial Center t-1
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1
Turnover Ratio t-1
Team Mgmt. t-1

(2)
Treatment

(3)
OLS

(4)
Treatment

0.456***
(5.169)
0.008
(1.372)
0.027
(1.640)
0.079
(0.860)
-0.009**
(-2.003)
0.020
(0.948)
0.067
(0.782)
0.025
(1.180)
0.148
(1.526)
0.000
(0.341)
-0.484***
(-3.617)

0.459***
(5.147)
0.008
(1.349)
0.029*
(1.728)
0.076
(0.824)
-0.035***
(-3.392)
-0.022
(-0.849)
0.625***
(2.755)
-0.001
(-0.028)
0.273**
(2.551)
0.001
(1.526)
-0.468***
(-3.470)
1.127***
(2.694)

1.962***
(8.942)
0.002
(0.172)
0.064**
(2.279)
-0.129
(-0.782)
0.004
(0.815)
-0.054*
(-1.702)
-0.055
(-0.397)
-0.201***
(-5.765)
-0.741***
(-3.973)
1.000***
(897.262)
0.102
(0.433)

1.964***
(8.930)
0.002
(0.192)
0.064**
(2.248)
-0.127
(-0.772)
0.018
(1.039)
-0.032
(-0.758)
-0.345
(-0.893)
-0.187***
(-5.046)
-0.803***
(-3.854)
0.999***
(837.788)
0.092
(0.388)
-0.575
(-0.869)

Yes
Yes
1,808
14.1%

Yes
Yes
1,808
14.6%

Yes
Yes
1,808
99.9%

Yes
Yes
1,808
99.9%

Inverse Mills Ratio
Category Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
Pseudo R2/Adj. R2

Port. Turnover

(1)
Probit
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Table VIII
Successor Origin and Cross-sectional Performance
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Treatment Effect Model that conduct cross-sectional
comparison of post-replacement fund performance between internal successors and external successors. The model
is specified as in equation (5). The dependent variable is fund’s annualized four-factor alpha estimated over the
subsequent three-year window (i.e. month t+1 to month t+3). External is an indicator variable that equals one if a
manager is an external successor and zero if she is an internal successor. Deviation is measured by the absolute
difference between the actual decision of manager origin (0 or 1) and the predicted probability generated from probit
regression (4). Deviation Dummy equals to one if deviation is greater than 50% and zero othewise. Other
independent variables are defined in Table I. All specifications include category dummies and year dummies. The
standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***,**,
and * respectively.
Dependent Variable: Performance
Variables

(1)

External

-0.126
(-0.434)

(2)

-1.336**
(-2.017)

Deviation
Deviation Dummy
Experience
SAT/100
MBA
Four-factor Alpha t-1
Ln Family Assets t-1
Financial Center t-1
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1
Turnover Ratio t-1
Team Mgmt. t-1
Inverse Mills Ratio
Category Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
Adj. R2

(3)

-0.028
(-1.505)
0.112**
(2.441)
0.316
(1.145)
0.019
(0.486)
-0.035
(-0.374)
0.393
(0.501)
0.005
(0.069)
-1.236***
(-3.195)
-0.002
(-0.731)
-0.501
(-0.960)
0.855
(0.581)
Yes
Yes
1,808
7.1%

-0.024
(-1.332)
0.112**
(2.433)
0.324
(1.189)
0.033
(0.858)
-0.016
(-0.176)
0.210
(0.270)
0.016
(0.213)
-1.246***
(-3.214)
-0.002
(-0.932)
-0.474
(-0.916)
0.182
(0.125)
Yes
Yes
1,808
7.4%
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-0.699**
(-2.439)
-0.023
(-1.288)
0.113**
(2.452)
0.329
(1.209)
0.025
(0.656)
-0.029
(-0.313)
0.348
(0.441)
0.010
(0.133)
-1.211***
(-3.111)
-0.002
(-0.876)
-0.485
(-0.939)
0.609
(0.415)
Yes
Yes
1,808
7.5%

Table IX
Successor Origin and Net Flows
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the Treatment Effect Model that conduct cross-sectional
comparison of post-replacement fund net flows between internal successors and external successors. The dependent
variable is fund’s annualized net flows estimated over the subsequent one-year window (i.e. month t+1 to month
t+12). The independent variable are defined as in Table IX. All specifications include category dummies and year
dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is
indicated by ***,**, and * respectively.
Dependent Variable: Net Flows
Variables

(1)

External

-1.095
(-1.083)

(2)

-5.146**
(-2.256)

Deviation
Deviation Dummy
Experience
SAT/100
MBA
Four-factor Alpha t-1
Four-factor Alpha2 t-1
Ln Family Assets t-1
Net Flows t-1
Financial Center t-1
Ln Fund Assets t-1
Expense Ratio t-1
Turnover Ratio t-1
Team Mgmt. t-1
Inverse Mills Ratio
Category Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
Adj. R2

(3)

-0.063
(-0.993)
0.223
(1.187)
0.950
(0.880)
0.233**
(1.975)
-0.001
(-0.800)
1.450***
(4.186)
0.226***
(9.715)
-4.102*
(-1.646)
-2.370***
(-9.165)
-5.009***
(-4.301)
-0.010*
(-1.700)
-1.191
(-0.557)
-8.586*
(-1.784)
Yes
Yes
1,808
24.8%

-0.063
(-0.993)
0.223
(1.187)
0.950
(0.880)
0.233**
(1.975)
-0.001
(-0.800)
1.450***
(4.186)
0.226***
(9.715)
-4.102*
(-1.646)
-2.370***
(-9.165)
-5.009***
(-4.301)
-0.010*
(-1.700)
-1.191
(-0.557)
-8.586*
(-1.784)
Yes
Yes
1,808
25.0%
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-2.381**
(-2.414)
-0.057
(-0.923)
0.218
(1.165)
0.928
(0.867)
0.295**
(2.485)
-0.001
(-1.118)
1.514***
(4.359)
0.225***
(9.658)
-4.757*
(-1.899)
-2.335***
(-9.027)
-5.052***
(-4.348)
-0.012*
(-1.954)
-1.069
(-0.502)
-10.876**
(-2.214)
Yes
Yes
1,808
25.0%

